Applying What’s Good for Foreign Affairs on the Domestic Front

By OOI KEE BENG

OVER THE YEARS, as one studies Malaysian history in all its aspects, an uncomfortable feeling grows strong that the ethnic diversity of its post-colonial population, by falling into the nation-state trap of racial ranking, has turned attention away from the geopolitical and geo-economic conditions in which the country develops under.

Nothing in Malaysian policies has been as stable as its foreign policy. And nowhere in the whole of East and Southeast Asia has the military been as insignificant to nation building and national identity as the Malaysian armed forces.

The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration signed in 1971 by the ASEAN-5, expressing for Malaysia the principle of neutrality popularised by its Deputy Prime Minister Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman already in 1966, provided the logic for the country’s regional if not its international relations until this day.

A low level of interest in the possibilities that the realm of foreign policies offers has therefore persisted. This reflects at the same time, the defensive stance taken in the realm of domestic politics. In essence, the reliance from Day One on Malay identity markers as national symbols has been useful as a nation-building short-cut, but in the longer term, what that has led to is the dominance of a conceptually conservative, divisive and defensive ideology of nation building.

Domestic politics, as we know, deems punishment and policing as the key tools of nation building, and tends to define nation building as a bubbled affair largely disinterested in the policies, ambitions and successes of neighbouring countries. Instead, the defence interest is turned inwards, towards racially defined dominance in education, the civil service, land ownership, stock ownership, so on and so forth.

Race and religion continue to precede citizenship (and non-citizenship) as national concerns, as markers of nationhood and national identity.

All this is understandable, given the peninsula’s modern history of disastrous events—sustained colonisation, compact migration, sudden invasion, internal insurgencies and racial riots. Add to that the troubled creation of the Federation of Malaysia, with Singapore joining and leaving, and the confrontation with Indonesia. One should of course not forget the Cold War tensions and conflicts affecting the whole region until 1990.

But in failing to break out of this path dependence and this conceptual trap left behind by the actions of external forces, Malaysia remains a victim of its past, and of its failure to accept itself as a novel and new political creation.

Seeing Malaysia as a part of ASEAN, seeing ASEAN as a part of Asia, and seeing Asia as a part of an emerging multipolar world, would diminish the conflicts of emotions within the country, emeotions whcih stem from a refusal to consider what Malaysia is, what is within it, and what is outside it.

Considering non-Malays as unwelcome intruders in Malaysia, as has been evident in recent troubling statements made by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad on the unconstitutionality of multiculturalism, and by the Kedah Mentri Besar, Mohammad Sanusi Md Nor on the legal status of Kedah’s neighbouring fellow state of Penang, are domestic politics of conflict taking place in their minds as foreign policy—foreign to their narrow understanding of history and of human societies. They seem to champion boundaries within the peninsula relevant in the early 20^th century.

The issue thus boils down to the ontological nature of the country we call the Federation of Malaysia. Being proclaimed Federation of Malaya in 1948, the nascent country in principle accepted multi-ethnicity to be part and parcel of its essence. So what Onn Ja’afar, the founder of UMNO, tried to do in the early 1950s—i.e. opening up the Malay-based party to non-Malays—was but the logical step to take, following the founding of the federation.

As we know, this was a bridge too far to cross and a hurdle too obvious to clear for the followers of his day. Judging from the discourse Mahathir and Sanusi now choose to resurrect, drawing borders within the country’s population remains an easy strategy to adopt for quick gains.

Working towards equal rights for citizens remains the only possible path to long-term domestic peace. This path can include affirmative action and quotas, but the final goal must remain clear.

After having served as ambassador to the United Nations, as ambassador to the United States in 1957-58 and as minister in various capacities including home affairs over the following 15 years, till his death on August 2, 1973, Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman worked on a common path for the country’s domestic and foreign policies to take.

That path is especially promising today, when big power tensions return to the region. For the diverse region of Southeast Asia, and for the diverse country of Malaysia, the principles of mutual peace and neutrality can pave the way towards a bright and prosperous future for ASEAN and for its member states—both in foreign relations and domestic relations.

As we can perceive so clearly in international relations, mutual respect and mutual interests are key to dialogue and mutual development. In domestic relations, the rationale is no different.

Dato’ Dr Ooi Kee Beng is the Executive Director of Penang Institute. His recent works include The Reluctant Politician. Tun Dr Ismail and His Time. (ISEAS Publishing 2007). His upcoming book is Signals in the Noise. Notes on Penang, Malaysia and the World. Singapore Faction Press.