Deconstructing the Notion of Good Governance

By OOI KEE BENG, for The Edge Malaysia, in the column “Picking on the Present”; 26 May – 1 June 2025.

AS A RULE, one should focus more on structure, purpose and process when talking about Governance. This is all the more important when one is to discuss the notion of “Good Governance”, and the lack of it. However, the word “good” tends to draw us into a discussion about ethics and about laws, and such a path in turn tends to end in simplistic conclusions about the lack moral and dedicated leaders, and the need for effective legislations.

How such leaders are to appear at the top of a system that has not been excelling in good governance is of course the big dilemma. The issue is therefore a systemic one, and the system in question should not be limited only to the state, the government or the parliament, but to the whole of society.

Firstly, instead of arguing over good governance as a moral or legalist achievement, we would do better to consider whether and to what extent, a given system of governance delivers “goods” to the public, or not.

It is easy enough for us to imagine a government that is relatively clean, and yet does not deliver the goods—be this for lack of vision, for ideological reasons, for fear of bringing changes, etc. “Good governance” as a term, then, is more relatable if it is first and foremost about the effective delivering of public goods; that criterion should suffice in determining what good governance amounts to. The following question then is, “What are the desired public goods and how should they be prioritised?”

There comes the catch about “the public”. Who belongs to it? How is that collective defined? Simply through citizenship? And do we need, for policymaking reasons dissect that collective into various sectors, as must happen if affirmative action is needed, or if identity policies require it?

To imagine that such a collective should be imagined and managed as if no effective differences exist within it is delusional, vain, and unsustainable. At the same time, if too many deep differences that affect policy thinking are allowed, one sows and perpetuates disunity, and in the process, risks secession.

But to deny huge differences or to seek eradication of them already suggest that the citizenry was too artificial and incidental a creation to start with.

In many post-colonial polities, this dilemma has been unavoidable. Myanmar today bears painful testimony to that, persisting as an extreme case for how majoritarian ambitions to form a unitary state in a diverse territory almost always lead to serial disasters. 

Federalism as the Tool for National Unity

Therewith comes the need for federalism.

Imagining inclusivity being achievable through centralisation—ethnic or political—has been a sad consequence of the excessive nationalising of (post-colonial) territories commonly undertaken, and of diverse societies being considered more readily united than they can be.

Throughout the world over the last few decades, therefore, the federalist solution has been practised, albeit oftentimes not in name. Basically, federalism is the wisdom that governance functions best if the power to redistribute wealth, privileges and opportunities, and deliver basic goods, is decentralised, with respect to the inherent and inherited diversity of component parts of the citizenry.

In fact, Malaysia’s modern history and structure testify to this wisdom. The Malayan Union idea that the British tried to apply in 1946 was strongly rejected by the Malay community and ignored by most other inhabitants of the peninsula. This revealed most shockingly the lack of local knowledge and the sense of desperation that the Foreign Office in London suffered from after WWII. In response, the political diversity of their Malayan colonies demanded to be heard. This diversity also existed within the Malay community itself, and even though Malay leaders as a group then had the chance to lay the groundwork for a unitary Malay state, they ended up agreeing to form a federation instead—a federation of sultanate, in fact. Malaya’s multi-layered ethnic complexity had to be acknowledged; A questionable “social contract” was later agreed upon laid the foundation for independence in 1957—of the Federation of Malaya.

The need for adaptive federalism in a diverse country became even more evident after the Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963. Within two years, the persistent quest to centralise power led to Singapore going its own way. That need for adaptive federalism has remained, growing stronger and stronger over the decades.

Malaysia began as a constitutional federation because it needed to be so, given its increasing diversity in the colonial period and the geopolitical conditions that midwifed the country’s existence.

A strongly related concept to consider here, and to good benefit, is “Subsidiarity”. The Cambridge Dictionary tells us that Subsidiarity is “the principle that decisions should always be taken at the lowest possible level or closest to where they will have their effect, for example in a local area rather than for a whole country”.

This notion presents federalism as a technical solution, and not merely a political one.

Governance as a Technical Matter

Another profound difficulty facing governance in a country like Malaysia is the balance in the public service between the proportion of bureaucrats and of technocrats. Governance cannot possible function well if it is largely a hierarchy made up mainly of bureaucrats and with only a small number of professionally trained experts and technocrats. The search to achieve and maintain an effective balance between these is an ongoing concern in most countries. In Malaysia, the imbalance is painfully obvious, and discussions about it is never taken seriously.

One more factor to consider regarding the institutional basis for good governance is the diversity in a society of what I herewith call “leader-generating mechanisms”. In the wake of colonial collapse, the various post-colonial nations exhibited a different of different power groups.

We know for example that the military have played a key role in almost all Southeast Asian countries in throwing up national leaders, for better or worse. Excepting Malaysia, most interestingly.

But all new polities, including Malaysia, have tried hard to limit, if not eradicate the academic class, especially social scientists and humanists. The same went for unionists, civil society organisations, the mass media, and many other organisational forms which potentially could throw up personalities with the gumption and confidence to aim for political influence and power, or challenge the state.

There has inevitably existed a predisposition for certain ruling hierarchies in these countries to attempt to monopolise and control leader-generation within their often diverse societies. Malaysian history tells us that it has been political parties which have held most sway in determining policy, discourse and the modes of power.

In short, common purpose and good governance are achievable through steady reforms towards devolution of power, technocratisation of the public service, acceptance of subsidiarity, and diversification in “leaders-generating mechanisms”. The end goal should along the way become clearly embedded in the process: It is to supply the citizenry with public goods as effectively and inclusively as possible.

This article is based on a speech given by Datuk Dr Ooi Kee Beng at the “G25 Public Forum on Good Governance” held at Gurney Bay Hotel on 17 May 2025. The author is the Executive Director of Penang Institute, and Senior Visiting Fellow at ISEAS — Yusof Ishak Institute. He is the award-winning author of The Reluctant Politician: The Life and Time of Tun Dr Ismail (ISEAS 2007). His latest book is “The Reluctant Nation: Malaysia’s Vain Quest for Common Purpose”. Web page: wikibeng.com.