Time for ASEAN to Punch in its Heavyweight Class

By OOI KEE BENG

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be proudly considered one of the great achievements of diplomacy in the world. For the region itself, the initiative has allowed for the various member states to be cognizant of each other’s differences and difficulties.

Be that as it may, it has yet to live up to its potential. In fact, without much exaggeration, one could say that it is one of the most under-used international associations in the world. Its own member states have tended to consider it a diplomatic ritual, albeit one with more international weight than each of them on their own is able to imagine.

But then, that is the point of regional organizations, or any bilateral or multilateral initiative; the whole promises to be larger than the sum of all its parts. ASEAN was founded in August 1967—exactly 58 years ago—by the five major countries in the archipelago. Of special interest is the fact that this happened four years after the Federation of Malaysia was formed, only two years after Singapore became a country in its own right, and one year after the konfrontasi between these two, backed Western allies, and their powerful neighbour, Indonesia. This conflict over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia also involved tensions with the Philippines.

Clearly, the lesson learned by these proximate neighbours was that they needed to talk to each other, whatever their political differences might be. And so ASEAN was formed. There was of course also the pressure from without; the Cold War was getting very hot globally, most notably to the immediate north, in Indo-China.

The founding governments put aside their differences, and wisely sought to defend themselves regionally instead of just nationally, in the process developing a viable level of trust among themselves. This is a powerful example of a strategy I call “Nation building by regional means”, which in effect is a vital step to take in the decolonization process of each of the member states. The alternative was for each of them to be dependent on, or be at the mercy of global powers and their shifting priorities instead.

This formula took on new meaning after the Cold War ended. With boundaries drawn by geography and geopolitical history, Southeast Asia became a conceivable region almost by default, bordered from without almost like a leftover; it is the place south of China, east of India, north of Australia and west of the Pacific.

It is thus not only the nexus for civilizations but also one of the most important transport routes in the world. How then is it not able to punch in its weight class?

This is a question to ask within the emerging discipline of Geopolitical Psychology, and involves analyses about the nature—and the history—of power.

Firstly, the ASEAN states are all relatively new, meaning their understanding of their own political economy is weak, and their ability to remain united highly uncertain, for domestic as much as for geopolitical reasons. Thus the important role the military has played in the nation-building (nation-destroying) process of most of them. Most also suffer from serious centre–periphery tensions.

In short, the nation-building fervour of each country has largely been introverted and reclusive. Only in economic matters do they most easily relate to the outside. In strategic and cultural matters, their minds are obsessed with issues of unity and disunity, and identity and diversity.

During the second half of its existence, ASEAN has been able to relate comfortably to the rest of the world, through tourism and international trade, and so on. Geo-economics provided comfortable win–win channels for member states to connect to the world, pushing geopolitical contingencies to take a back seat, at least until recent months.

It is nevertheless in the creation of multilateral trade platforms that ASEAN has shone most brightly.

Secondly, the collective strength of ASEAN is not really embraced by its own member governments. The total consensus that is required for all important decisions to be made is a stumbling block no doubt; what this also does is to limit the confidence of the member states in how much ASEAN actually can accomplish. Political will cannot be demonstrably strong if power is diluted as a matter of course. If the assumption is that political will is necessarily weak, then policy suggestions cannot but be cautious, unadventurous and diplomatic.

A time of geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, such as the present moment, calls for ASEAN to rise above its inherited restraints and envision a future when it punches at its own weigh, and not below it, as has always been the case.

Lastly, ASEAN, having walked on eggshells since its birth, suffers from an excessive bureaucratization of its institutions. Procedures and processes—while necessary in any organization—can be done in excess. These demotivate the ambitious, slow down and disillusion the most fervent of policy thinkers, and undermine the credibility and functionality of the organization as a whole.

Knowing your own weight is of course key to your ability to punch at the correct level. This requires you to know your competitors. Ignoring that, and continuing as an introvert is not a very effective epistemic attitude to have.

In that important sense, Malaysia being effective in achieving a ceasefire in the border war between two of its northern ASEAN neighbours is highly encouraging.

It may signal that ASEAN is maturing, and that its perhaps most important role—that of being the conduit for member states to exercise “nation building by regional means”—is finally being recognized.