Can ASEAN Adapt to Operate Effectually in a Geopolitically Complex World?

By Ooi Kee Beng, for The Edge Malaysia, 20-27 June 2026

TWO THINGS that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been depending upon for its slow-and-steady, all-aboard method to deliver are firstly a lack of urgency, and secondly an absence of unrelenting outside pressure. Anyone concerned about the issues the organization purports to handle, be it climate change matters or healthcare collaboration, must possess a lot of patience, and they must hope that distractive geopolitical tensions are not being exerted upon the region.

Both these luxuries are not available to ASEAN at the moment, which explains why questions are being raised about its unity and its way forward. Where lies its relevance when the big powers compete seriously and openly in the region? Where lies its much-heralded unity and group agency?

There are three significant points to understand about ASEAN: Firstly, it became truly regional only at the turn of the century. Effectively, it is still a fledgling youth. It is certainly not inexperienced, but it does not have a loud or authoritative voice. Secondly, the geographical region it represents is a strange one in that it is bounded from the outside rather than glued together by some internal dynamic. And thirdly, its role in modern world history is often written for it by external global forces rather than by some common ideal among its members. Its unity relies on soft language and low voices.

To be sure, in the right context, a quiet and patient host does command the room. Skilled in Asian diplomacy, ASEAN appreciates clear protocol, assumes good behaviour from its members and partners, and it fosters the use of non-confrontational language.

With that understanding, one is able to have realistic expectations of what ASEAN can easily achieve and realise what matters will have to wait. Whichever the case, one cannot deny the success ASEAN has had in nurturing patience and understanding among its members; its achievements as a champion of multilateralism, and its amplification of each member’s international relevance. These positive traits are almost attained by default. There lies the strength of Southeast Asian regionalism. To that extent, it does have a solid base.

Beyond those competences though, ASEAN can seem feeble and fragile. In a peaceful world, ASEAN has the time it needs, and enough adaptability and diplomacy at hand to cruise along and pick up multilateral successes here and there. It did not have that in the early years—from 1967 to 1991. And it does not have that now, not since 2015 or thereabouts.

Between those periods, ASEAN shone. ASEAN Centrality was a natural and necessary goal, an evolved ambition that came out of having time and no urgency, and in the absence of serious big-power elbowing within its territories. The principles of neutrality and ZOPFAN were aimed at securing these conditions. ASEAN knows itself.

At its founding, ASEAN was already a misnomer. It proffered the region of Southeast Asia as its arena and responsibility. This was despite the fact that the original members governed only the maritime areas, and in fact, ASEAN appeared as ideological alternative to the Indochinese part of the region. On hindsight, one could therein already find an institutional and influential aspiration—a sly and suggestive claim for the future made within a warring and divisive bipolar world.

Big Power Elbows

That kind of world seems to be back now. And with it comes a discouraging and debilitating sense of urgency. The luxury of time, of delaying decisions and discussions, is no longer available. Big powers diminish the integrity and sovereignty of the region and places its status far below the imperatives of their own global—especially geoeconomic—interests.

For ASEAN, the present times is a reality check. The region cannot really passively expect conducive times to come back for ASEAN to retake the driver’ seat.

ASEAN Centrality will have to be re-acquired and maintained through other means. As argued, the Southeast Asian regionalist project is vital to the long-term wellbeing of its members. At the very least, it provides the positive effects mentioned before which it receives almost by default.

These members must however admit that their capabilities and opportunities have been reactions and responses to then-relevant geopolitical and geoeconomic actions of big powers. And that that is the past now.

Keeping all that in mind, ASEAN should be able to innovate and evolve out of its preference for bureaucratic decision making and performance, and instead nurture mutual trust and pragmatic modes of action conducive to much higher levels of regionalist ambition.

 A multipolar world is at hand (or has returned?). Will ASEAN, as it is now, fit comfortably and effectively into it? Or is this the opportune time for it to raise regionalist ambitions and revisit strategic goals, cognizant of how its members being new nations, being newly decolonized and being insecure within Cold War contestations had configured ASEAN’s original structure?

What multipolarity will look like depends on how institutions like ASEAN transform themselves. What we have now may be a new stage in the decolonizing and independence-building process of ASEAN members—and the Global South in general. First of all, multipolarity does not have to mean a divided world. Only a multifarious one.

By necessity, certain new notions have already appeared as initial practical response to such a world. Plurilateralism as a concept was ventured quite a while ago to activate the flexible space between bilateral and multilateral undertakings. Lately, one hears of “polylateralism” as well. This seeks international collaboration beyond state governments to involve NGOs and local administrations, corporations and scientific institutions, for addressing complex global issues. One thinks immediately of climate change matters, natural disasters and pandemics; but why not supply chain security as well?

The essence of what is happening, really, is the realization that collaboration is the key into the future One could formalize collaboration heavily, as among lawyers, or one could leave it pragmatic and lose. In fact, once collaboration is normalized as the discourse rationale in international affairs, including trade, the Thucydides Trap can be avoided. Outside of bipolarity, there is no need for small nations like Southeast Asian countries, and middle powers like ASEAN, to balance and hedge in fear; there would just be pragmatic steps to take, and mutual benefits to seek. Country to country, region to region, country to region.

* This article was inspired into being during my recent stay at the Artists’ Retreat of Rimbun Dahan in Sungei Buloh.

* Datuk Dr Ooi Kee Beng is the executive director of Penang Institute, founding editor of Penang Monthly, festival director of the George Town Literary Festival, and senior visiting fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. His books include the award-winning The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time, In Lieu of Ideology: An Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee and The Eurasian Core and Its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu on the History of the World. Homepage: wikibeng.com