//
you're reading...
Articles, Commentaries, The Edge

The Global South in the Age of Asian Region Building

By Ooi Kee Beng. In The Edge 21-27 November 2026.

THERE ARE at least two facts that need to be discussed before one can properly use the term “multipolarity” for geopolitical analysis today.

Firstly, humans have been establishing civilizations across the world, usually along coastlines and rivers for centuries. Each of these areas has been effective in defining and perpetuating the cultural and political identities of their inhabitants. And so, it is a fact that the world has, for a long time, been home to multiple civilizations.

This is, however, not enough for us to use the term multipolar to describe early human history. The fate of these various civilizations, or nations, or poles, had to be brought together through the shrinking of travel distances before multipolarity could be significantly useful in describing global events.

No doubt, we have had civilizations being overwhelmed before that, but most tellingly, these were usually achieved by rampaging hordes of horsemen coming out of Central Asia, and in all directions. But it was with the oceanic travels initiated by the Iberian Catholic kingdoms of Spain and Portugal by the end of the 15th century that rampages could take place across oceans, and upon distinctly separated societies. Pirates replacing horsemen was how modern times began—and how multipolar relations became a subject worthy of study.

The ability to traverse oceans brought global geopolitics into being. Societies that had had nothing—or little—to do with each other had to suddenly deal with each. Some of these, we can classify as civilizations, and some more hesitantly so. This is also the dawn of “international” relations before most societies in the world learned to see themselves as nations.

Poles of human existence

Instead of international or inter-civilizational relations, therefore, I suggest “multipolar relations” as a denotation for the overarching study of the modern era of inter-societal and inter-polity relations.

With the shrinking of effective distances between what had been separate civilizations, humanity entered a stage in history where these “poles” became immediately relevant to each other.

Now Western approaches to history have taught us to think of this period as Colonialism.

But what is deeply doubtful about that term is of course the fact that it heightened the role and agency of Western powers and casted all others as victims of their scientific, intellectual and military backwardness, or their misguided economic, political and religious history. In effect, it unipolarised the world already from day one.

The struggle until the 21st century is one that has been between the unipolarising (one could say hegemonizing) tendencies of Western colonialism, and resistance and/or hedging by all other poles against that relentless dynamic. The need to “hedge” by local leaders of lands being colonized by western powers is what the leaders of nation-states built from these colonized lands continue to suffer today vis-à-vis global powers.

Hedging is not a new condition or option for the less powerful in global politics’ it is a default for them. This reminds me of the strange attractiveness of the notion of a “Clash of Civilizations” used by Samuel Huntington in the 1990s to predict the nature of conflicts across the world when such a clash has in fact been going on since the beginning of the 16th century. You hedge when your options are very limited, a situation one should not be content with.

Colonialism was always a struggle for territorial and trade route control between Western powers. Thus, the struggles against it were for a long time a fragmented one. That fragmented resistance settled neatly into notions of nationalism in each of the disparate colonized territories.

Realization over the futility of this nationalism-based and globally fragmented resistance against European unipolarity was what fueled the thinking of many anti-colonialists across the world in the mid-20th century. Globalist ideologies such as communism became an easy and obvious path for them to take.

The Bandung Conference (officially the Asian-African Conference) held on 18-24 April 1955 in Indonesia by 29 newly independent countries, was significant in that it expressed how the recent success of nationalism was not quite enough in the struggle against European unipolarity and hegemony.

The global struggle had by then taken the form of a weapons race and territorial war between USA/NATO and USSR/Warsaw Pact, which we term the Cold War.

Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement grew as a movement inspired by the Bandung Conference to have 120 members and is planning to hold its 20th summit in Uzbekistan in 2027. When the Global South is mentioned today, it is in that context, and most often refers to this movement.

But what does it now mean when we talk about the multipolar world?

Connecting the poles

The second fact that needs mentioning is that what the discussion above shows is that while decolonization is necessarily an anti-unipolar movement, it is also a joint and sustained effort by the Global South to synergize it protracted but fragmented resistance against the substantial vestiges of colonialism. In that ambition to converge this global resistance to unipolarity, multipolarity gains increasing relevance as a goal.

The first stage in multipolar world-building to replace unipolar hegemony has been the rise of postcolonial countries—nation-state building. In itself, national independence was not going to bring rounded development for the many subjugated communities or secure them a dignified place in the world.

It was often assumed that the limitations of post-colonial nation-building could be overcome to an extent by regionalism. Thus, the formation of endless regional bodies since the 1960s, such as ASEAN, OIC, SAARC, COMESA, EAC…. The list is endless. Regionalism was to supplement nationalism.

But as certain larger non-Western countries began to succeed in their nation-building, and in some cases to such an extent that the unipolar power feels seriously challenged, the third stage in multipolar world-building is reached. It is based on “open multilateralism” more than on “territorial regionalism”.

One could call this third stage “Region building”. I argue that multipolarity should essentially be focused on region building, as a means to avoid geopolitical polarizing instead. Going forward, therefore, countries such as Malaysia should increasingly factor region building into their nation-building ambitions—and their foreign policies.

* Datuk Dr Ooi Kee Beng is the executive director of Penang Institute, founding editor of Penang Monthly, festival director of the George Town Literary Festival, and senior visiting fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. His influential books include The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time and The Eurasian Core and its Edges: Dialogues on World History with Wang Gungwu. Homepage: wikibeng.com.

Unknown's avatar

About Ooi Kee Beng

Dr OOI KEE BENG is the Executive Director of Penang Institute (George Town, Penang, Malaysia). He was born and raised in Penang, and was the Deputy Director of ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISEAS). He is the founder-editor of the Penang Monthly (published by Penang Institute), ISEAS Perspective (published by ISEAS) and ISSUES (published by Penang Institute). He is also editor of Trends in Southeast Asia, and a columnist for The Edge, Malaysia.

Discussion

No comments yet.

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.